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 Semantic Flexibility in Scientific Practice:
 A Study of Newton's Optics
 Michael Bishop
 Most people, no matter how sophisticated their grasp of science or its his-
 tory, believe that scientific language is special. It can be distinguished from
 the language of politics, art, and religion by its rigid precision. Exactly
 what this rigid precision amounts to is a matter of heated philosophical
 controversy. We can abstract away from the controversy by focusing on a
 doctrine that is common to almost all views of scientific language, seman-
 tic essentialism. According to semantic essentialism, any scientific term
 that appears in a well-confirmed scientific theory has a fixed kernel of
 meaning.1 My aim in this paper is to overthrow the dogma of semantic
 essentialism, and by doing so, uncover some insights about the nature of
 scientific rhetoric and argumentation. These insights have been hidden by
 a blinkered adherence to a view that fails to recognize the suppleness and
 flexibility of scientific language.
 The paper's main body has six sections. Section 1 shows how semantic
 essentialism has been used to interpret Newton's early writings on optics.
 Section 2 argues that the essentialist interpretations of Newton's first pub-
 lication are uncharitable and unmotivated. A more context-sensitive read-
 ing of this work leads us to see that as Newton marshals more evidence for
 his view, his arguments tend to employ steadily bolder concepts. Section 3
 sketches the central issues raised in two criticisms of Newton's first publi-
 cation and in Newton's responses to them. We see how Newton understood
 the central concepts he employed in his first publication. Section 4 uncov-
 ers a heretofore unrecognized anomaly in Newton's optical writings: In
 June 1672, Newton posted, probably in one envelope, inconsistent accounts
 of the central concept he employed in his first publication. How could this
 be? Ascribing to Newton such a blatant inconsistency requires some expla-
 nation. I suggest that, unbeknownst to Newton and to legions of interpret-
 Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 32, No. 3, 1999. Copyright © 1999 The Pennsylvania State
 University, University Park, PA.
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 ers, some of the concepts expressed in Newton's first publication were par-
 tially indeterminate, and hence permit different, and even inconsistent, in-
 terpretations. Section 5 proposes two general considerations in favor of a
 semantically sensitive view of scientific language that are not contingent
 on the details of any particular historical episode. And, finally, section 6
 briefly explores some philosophical implications of recognizing the flex-
 ibility of scientific language.
 A word about semantics and terminology. I often say that a term ex-
 presses a concept and that concepts make certain presuppositions or as-
 sumptions. Such talk is very loose and informal. Let me state my assump-
 tions more formally. A particular use of a term can express a concept, and
 that concept is the meaning of the term. A concept has a certain content,
 and that content can be represented by one or more descriptions, perhaps
 very complicated descriptions. For example, the term bachelor expresses a
 concept whose content can be represented by descriptions such as "an un-
 married man." (That many will reject some or all of these assumptions is
 of no matter. The main points in this paper stand, though somewhat al-
 tered, if we adopt an alternative view of meaning.2)
 1 . Traditional interpretations of Newton's
 early optical writings
 Most seventeenth-century theories of the nature and behavior of light em-
 ploy light ray as the central explanatory concept. When Newton published
 his first paper in 1672, the conventional view of light and colors held that
 white light consisted of rays that were basic and homogeneous. Different
 colors were the result of different modifications of white light. Red light
 was the result of a modification of white light, blue light was the result of
 a different modification of white light, and so on. Newton tried to turn the
 conventional view of colors on its head. He proposed that each particular
 color of light is homogeneous. Red light consists of rays that are all of a
 kind, as does blue light, and yellow light. White light is a mixture of light
 of all different colors; it consists of heterogeneous light rays.
 What did Newton mean by the term light ray! This question, as posed,
 invites an essentialist answer (Wittgenstein 1953). To the best of my knowl-
 edge, every historian who has tackled the question has argued that light
 ray possessed some fixed kernel of meaning for some significant portion
 of Newton's career. For example, A. I. Sabra (1967) and Vasco Ronchi
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 (1970) argue that throughout his entire career, Newton employed a concept
 of light ray that presupposes that light is made of particles. Of course, the
 particle view of light was opposed by many of Newton's contemporaries,
 notably Hooke and Huygens. They believed that light consists of waves
 propagated through a pervasive ether.
 The view that Newton always employed a particle concept of light ray
 has fallen out of favor. Alan Shapiro (1975) has argued (rightly in my view)
 that Newton's concept of light ray did not always presuppose a particle
 view of light. Shapiro retains, however, the semantic essentialism of the
 Sabra-Ronchi view. According to Shapiro, early in Newton's career,
 Newton's concept of light ray always presupposed that individual light rays
 are monochromatic. Jed Z. Buchwald (1989, 6-7) has recently embraced
 something like Shapiro's interpretation of Newton's optical concepts.
 Shapiro's main argument springs from the following passage of Newton's
 Optical Lectures, which Newton gave prior to his first publication:
 If, however, someone has difficulty conceiving of several successive rays in
 the same straight line, let him imagine in place of the line OF a small space
 (in a physical sense equivalent to the line) in which many parallel but in-
 definitely close rays flow, so that they may be considered as sensibly coinci-
 dent. With these premises, it is known from Lects. 4, 5, 6 that these rays
 must not at all be conceived of to be similar, but a mixture of red-, yellow-,
 green-, blue-, and purple-making rays together with all their intermediate
 gradations, (qtd. in Shapiro 1984, 145-47)
 Fig. 1. Chromatic Dispersion. Reproduced with kind permission of Cambridge
 University Press. From Shapiro 1984, 144.
 From this passage, Shapiro concludes that Newton's concept of light ray
 presupposes that light rays are monochromatic. Shapiro's line of argument
 runs as follows: When Newton defines or describes light rays, he typically
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 says that light has "parts." The Optical Lectures makes it "clear, finally,
 what Newton meant by the 'parts' of light: the 'parts' are the rays of differ-
 ent color, whether they are constituted of atoms or rays as conceived in a
 wave theory of light" (Shapiro 1975, 207; emphasis added).
 Shapiro is absolutely right that in the above passage, Newton takes it
 for granted that light rays are monochromatic. The rays represented in fig-
 ure 1 by OF are "a mixture of red-, yellow-, green-, blue-, and purple-
 making rays together with all their intermediate gradations." But it is not
 clear that Newton is here offering an account of what he meant by parts of
 light. And even if we grant that what Newton means by light ray in this
 particular context is monochromatic rays, it does not follow that this was a
 dogmatic assumption always implicit in Newton's early work. Shapiro,
 however, argues that it was:
 Newton would continually attempt to placate his opponents by showing
 that his theory of colors does not depend on an emission theory of light, but
 there was one point on which he would not yield - white light is a heteroge-
 neous mixture of all colors. . . . [Newton's] 'dogmatism' reemerges in the
 assumption that colors are present in white light before refraction. (Shapiro
 1975, 208)
 The problem with Shapiro's suggestion is that Newton's discussion about
 the nature of light rays in the Optical Lectures is not an attempt to specify
 what Newton always (or even often) meant by the expression light ray or
 by parts of light. It is the conclusion of a long argument. Newton signals
 this by prefacing his remarks about the monochromatic nature of light rays
 with the phrase "it is known from Lects. 4, 5, 6. . . ." In these lectures,
 Newton describes a number of experiments that were supposed to support
 his theory of color. So, in the above context, Newton takes for granted the
 assumption that light rays are monochromatic, but only after having ar-
 gued for that assumption.
 Semantic essentialism ascribes to Newton a static concept of light ray, a
 concept that for some significant portion of Newton's career always made
 some definite substantive assumption about optics. These essentialist views
 all rest on the same mistake - illicit generalization. Semantic essentialists
 are perfectly correct to point out that Newton sometimes uses concepts
 that presuppose central elements of his own theories. However, simply
 because a scientist uses a concept that makes certain strong assumptions in
 one context, it does not follow that the scientist uses that concept in all
 contexts. To make this point, let us turn to Newton's first publication and
 some of its aftermath.
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 2. Interpreting Newton's first publication
 Isaac Newton submitted a paper to the Royal Society in February of 1672, at
 the request of the Society's Secretary, Henry Oldenburg. It was Newton's
 first publication, and in it he defends his theory of light and colors. By fo-
 cusing on Newton's descriptions of two experiments, I will argue that the
 semantic essentialists are mistaken about what presuppositions are inevita-
 bly implicit in Newton's concept of light ray. My goals, however, are not
 primarily critical. I want to argue that by embracing a context-sensitive in-
 terpretation of scientific expressions, we get insights about scientists' argu-
 mentative and rhetorical strategies that semantic essentialism hides. By aban-
 doning essentialism in favor of a more flexible view of scientific language,
 we will be open to seeing how Newton's concepts change as a text develops.
 2. 7. Newton's crucial experiment
 Newton's discussion of the crucial experiment in his first publication be-
 gins by noting that, after a circular beam of white light passes through a
 prism, it fans out. What explains this prismatic dispersion (also known as
 chromatic dispersion, since the light exiting the prism fans out into a spec-
 trum of colors)? To answer this question, Newton proposes his crucial ex-
 periment. It is designed to show that light disperses upon exiting the prism
 because white light consists of light rays of different degrees of "refrangi-
 bility"; in other words, white light consists of rays that are bent to different
 degrees by the prism. Newton explains, "I took two boards, and placed one
 of them close behind the Prisme at the window, so that the light might pass
 through a small hole." Newton then took another board with a small hole
 in it, placed it about twelve feet from the first board, and placed a prism
 behind the hole in this second board (see fig. 2):
 This done, I took the first Prisme in my hand, and turned it to and fro
 slowly about its Axis, so much as to make the several parts of the Image, cast
 on the second board, successively pass through the hole in it, that I might
 observe to what places on the wall the second Prisme would refract them.
 And I saw by the variation of those places, that the light, tending to that end
 of the Image, towards which the refraction of the first Prisme was made, did
 in the second Prisme suffer a Refraction considerably greater then the light
 tending to the other end. (Newton 1672a in Turnbull 1959, 94-95)
 Newton explains the dispersion as follows: "And so the true cause of
 the length of that Image was detected to be no other than that Light con-
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 Fig. 2. Newton's Crucial Experiment. Reproduced with kind permission of
 Cambridge University Press. From Turnbull 1959, 166.
 sists of Rays differently refrangible, which, without any respect to a differ-
 ence in their incidence, were, according to their degrees of refrangibility,
 transmitted toward divers parts of the wall" (95). This was Newton's cru-
 cial experiment.
 Although Newton opens his article by saying that he wants to address
 "the celebrated phenomena of colours," his discussion of the crucial ex-
 periment to this point is silent about the spectral colors produced by the
 prism. The phenomenon Newton focuses on is the fanning out of light upon
 exiting the prism. So, pace Shapiro and Buchwald, it is gratuitous to sug-
 gest that, in this particular context, Newton is employing a concept of light
 ray that presupposes anything about the nature of colors. Further, pace Sabra
 and Ronchi, there is no reason to suppose that, up to this point, Newton's
 discussion of the crucial experiment presupposes anything very specific
 about the substructure of light. A close examination of the crucial experi-
 ment shows at the very least that the semantic essentialists are wrong about
 what was inevitably implicit in Newton's concept of light ray. Of course,
 that is not to say that the discussion is altogether free of presuppositions. It
 assumes (perhaps among other things) that light rays usually travel in
 straight lines and that the light entering the prism consists of many light
 rays. Although the concept of light ray Newton employs in his discussion
 of his crucial experiment does not seem to be an especially interesting one,
 I shall argue that it is in fact an extraordinarily interesting concept. The
 explanation for this, however, will have to wait until section 5.
 2.2. The prism-lens experiment
 After a brief discussion of telescopes and microscopes, Newton sets down
 his theory of colors in thirteen "doctrines." In order to convince us that
 white light consists of light of all different colors, he describes his prism-
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 lens experiment. Newton began by passing a circular beam of light through
 a prism.
 Then place a Lens of about three foot radius ... at the distance of about
 four or five foot from thence, through which all those colours may at once
 be transmitted, and made by its Refraction to convene at a further distance
 of about ten or twelve foot. If at that distance you intercept this light with a
 sheet of white paper, you will see the colours converted into whiteness again
 by being mingled. But it is requisite, that the Prisme and Lens be placed
 steddy, and that the paper, on which the colours are cast, be moved to and
 fro; for, by such motion, you will not only find, at what distance the white-
 ness is most perfect, but also see, how the colours gradually convene, and
 vanish into whiteness, and afterwards having crossed one another in that
 place where they compound Whiteness, are again dissipated, and severed,
 and in an inverted order retain the same colours, which they had before they
 entered the composition. . . .
 In the annexed design of this Experiment, ABC representeth the Prism set
 endwise to sight, close by the hole F of the window EG. Its vertical Angle
 ACB may conveniently be about sixty degrees; MN designates the Lens. Its
 breadth 2 1/2 or 3 inches. SF one of the streight lines, in which difform Rays
 may be conceived to flow successively from the Sun. FP and FR two of those
 Rays unequally refracted, which the Lens makes to converge toward Q, and
 after decussation to diverge again. And HI the paper, at divers distances, on
 which the colors are projected: which in Q constitutes Whiteness, but are Red
 and Yellow in R, r . . . and Blew and Purple in P, p. ... (Newton 1672a in
 Turnbull 1959, 101)
 Fig. 3. The Prism-Lens Experiment. Reproduced with
 kind permission of Simon & Schuster, Inc. From Thayer
 1953, 79.
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 This description of the prism-lens experiment seems to employ a bolder
 notion of light ray than did the crucial experiment. Newton explicitly as-
 sumes his own view of prismatic dispersion - white light consists of
 "difform Rays," rays that are differently refrangible. Does it follow that
 Newton always used such a concept? No. In a context where prismatic
 dispersion was the issue, such as in his discussion of the crucial experi-
 ment, Newton need not have used this particular concept. And as we have
 already seen, he did not. To use a concept that assumed his views about
 prismatic dispersion when arguing for his views about prismatic disper-
 sion would have begged the question. But in this context, where Newton
 has already justified his theory of prismatic dispersion (at least to his own
 satisfaction) and is no longer arguing for it, he feels free to use the assump-
 tion that white light consists of rays that are differently refrangible.
 Given the assumptions that light rays are rectilinear and are differently
 refrangible, Newton argues that the prism-lens experiment supports his sev-
 enth "doctrine" - that white light is a mixture of all different colors. We can
 sketch Newton's argument as follows: We can tell by observation that the rays
 between Ρ and R (see fig. 3) produce many different colors. Since, according
 to the crucial experiment, each ray has its own degree of refrangibility, each
 is refracted independently by the lens. These rays then travel in straight lines
 to Q. We can tell by observation that at Q, the light appears white. In this
 particular experiment, a mixture of all the spectral colors produces white light.
 Therefore, white light is a mixture of all colors of the spectrum.
 We may legitimately wonder whether this conclusion comes too fast.
 And we may legitimately wonder whether Newton employs "reasonable"
 assumptions (whatever that means). But the argument from the prism-lens
 experiment does not employ a concept that presupposes Newton's theory of
 color. Newton's argument does not assume precisely what it sets out to prove.
 The context-sensitive reading of concepts allows us to ascribe to a sci-
 entist a series of layered arguments. For example, early in a work, Newton
 can employ a relatively weak concept of light ray to argue that light rays
 have interesting properties A, B, and C. After doing this, he can employ
 stronger concepts - concepts that make some of the assumptions he has
 already defended (like A, B, or C) - to argue that light rays have even more
 and different interesting properties. We see that Newton proposed layered
 arguments in his first publication. Early on, in his discussion of the crucial
 experiment, Newton's concept presupposes very little about the nature of
 light. But later, in his discussion of the prism-lens experiment, Newton's
 concept presupposes more - that white light consists of rays of different
 refrangibility. If we insist that Newton was "consistent" in his use of the
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 218 MICHAEL BISHOP
 expression light ray, we must concede that he could never have employed
 this kind of argumentative strategy.
 3. Newton on light rays: Responses to objections
 In his first publication, Newton presents a series of arguments that employ
 somewhat different concepts. Early on, the light ray concept explicitly
 makes fairly uncontentious assumptions. But later, after having defended
 more contentious hypotheses, Newton could employ concepts that assumed
 those stronger hypotheses. But how did Newton interpret his own concept
 of light ray? To answer this question, let us turn to Newton's responses to
 a pair of objections raised against his first publication.
 3. 7. Newton and Hooke
 In his paper, Newton states that "it can be no longer disputed . . . perhaps
 whether Light be a Body" (1672a, 100). Many critics, including Robert
 Hooke, understandably read this as an endorsement of an emission theory
 of light, in which light consists of particles projected from a luminous body.
 Hooke's rebuttal of Newton's paper does not question its experimental find-
 ings. In fact, Hooke begins by agreeing with Newton's experimental find-
 ings since he had already made "many hundreds" of those trials and "found
 them soe." Hooke argues that his mechanical hypotheses could explain
 Newton's findings "without any manner of difficulty or straining" (Hooke
 1672, 1 1 1). In fact, Hooke affirms, "I can assure Mr Newton I cannot only
 salve all the Phaenomena of Light and colours by the Hypothesis, I have
 formerly printed and now explicate yt by, but by two or three other, very
 differing from it" (113). Hooke believed that many theories of light could
 explain Newton's observational findings.
 Newton responds to Hooke by arguing that (1) his explanation of dis-
 persion is independent of any hypotheses about the substructure of light
 and (2) Newton's theory of dispersion is superior to Hooke's, which New-
 ton deemed "not onely insufficient, but in some respects unintelligible"
 (Newton 1672c, 176). The first line of defense is our only concern here.
 Newton begins by denying that the statement in his original paper, "it can
 be no longer disputed . . . perhaps whether Light be a Body" (1672a, 100),
 implied an emission theory of light:
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 'Tis true that from my Theory I argue the corporeity of light, but I doe it
 without any absolute positivenesse ... & make it at most but a very plau-
 sible consequence of the Doctrine, & not a fundamentall supposition. . . .
 But I knew that the Properties wch I declared of light were in some measure
 capable of being explicated not onely by that, but by many other Mechanicall
 Hypotheses. And therefore I chose to decline them all, & speake of light in
 generali termes, considering abstractedly as something or other propagated
 every way in streight lines from luminous bodies, without determining what
 that thing is, whether a confused mixture of difform qualities, or modes of
 bodies, or of bodies themselves, or of any virtues powers or beings whatso-
 ever. (Newton 1672c, 173-74)
 Here Newton insists that his original paper did not assume anything about
 the underlying structure of light. Light rays are the "something or other
 propagated every way in streight lines from luminous bodies." In this par-
 ticular context, Newton intends to express, and does express, a concept
 that assumes that a light ray is a visible beam of light; that concept does
 not assume anything about the underlying make up of light rays. Newton
 read that agnosticism back into his original paper. Why did Newton insist
 on this interpretation? Very simply, it was the only concept that would serve
 his rhetorical and argumentative purposes. Newton was responding to
 Hooke's allegation that his findings failed to support any of his conclu-
 sions - either about the substructure of light or about the proper explana-
 tion of prismatic dispersion. Newton wanted to avoid the first issue and
 trounce Hooke on the second, so he denied that he needed any assumption
 about the substructure of light. But he did need some notion of light ray in
 order to defend the proposition that white light consists of rays of different
 degrees of refrangibility. So, given this pair of constraints, he was forced
 to embrace a concept of light ray that makes no assumptions about the
 substructure of light: Light rays are the "something or other propagated
 every way in streight lines from luminous bodies." So far, so good.
 3.2. Newton and Pardies
 Pardies's response (actually, his second response) to Newton's paper pro-
 poses a specific competing explanation for chromatic dispersion - the dif-
 fusion hypotheses defended by Hooke and Grimaldi. Ironically, the account
 of chromatic dispersion defended by Hooke (among others) was an essen-
 tial part of Pardies's response to Newton, but not of Hooke's. Hooke's main
 point is quite general: Newton's findings were insufficient to force a choice
 between competing theories about the underlying nature of light and col-
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 ors. Pardies's point is much more specific. He argues that Newton's find-
 ings do not compel a choice between two specific competing mechanical
 explanations of chromatic dispersion. To understand Newton's response,
 we must turn briefly to the diffusion hypothesis Pardies was championing.
 The explanation of chromatic dispersion Hooke offered in his Micrographia
 (1665) employs both a conventional modification view of colors and a con-
 tinuum theory of light. Continuum theories of light hold that light is the propa-
 gation of a state (a pressure or motion) through some intervening medium
 (an ether). Hooke explained that between a luminous body and the eye is a
 "pellucid body" in which "the appulse of the luminous body may be commu-
 nicated or propagated through it to the greatest imaginable distance in the
 least imaginable time" (56). He adds, "The motion is propagated every way
 through an Homogeneous medium by direct or straight lines extended every
 way like Rays from the center of a Sphere" (57). Notice that, although Hooke
 defends a continuum (or wave) theory of light, light ray is the central ex-
 planatory term. This is an important point of contact between Hooke and
 Newton. It allows for the possibility (but does not guarantee) that they will
 sometimes express the same concepts of light ray in their explanations.
 Hooke explains colors as a kind of modification of white light. He sup-
 poses "ACFD to be a physical ray, or ABC and DEF to be two mathemati-
 cal rays, trajected from a very remote point of a luminous body through an
 homogeneous transparent medium LLL" (see fig. 4). Pulses of light (DA,
 Fig. 4. Hooke's Modification View of
 Colors. Reproduced with kind permission
 of Science Heritage Limited. From
 Hooke 1665/1987, schem. VI, fig. 1.
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 EB, FC) are "small portions of the orbicular impulses which must there-
 fore cut the rays at right angles" (57). Notice that, in figure 4, the pulses of
 light (AD, BE, CF) are perpendicular to the parallel light rays (AC and
 DF). While the ray that enters medium MMM (AC) travels from C to H,
 the other ray travels only from F to G. This causes the post-refraction pulses
 (GH and IK) to be oblique to the rays. According to Hooke, whenever the
 pulse is oblique to the rays, colors are produced (blue along ray CK and
 red along ray GI). So colors are produced when white light is modified in
 the appropriate way.
 Hooke's explanation of chromatic dispersion involves two factors. The
 first is diffusion. When physical ray ACFD (see fig. 4) first hits the new
 medium (MMM), the part of the pulse that hits the new medium first (ACK)
 is more "impeded by the resistance of the transparent medium, than the
 other part" of the pulse. The later part of the pulse (DGI) "will be pro-
 moted, or made stronger, having its passage already prepared" for it by the
 earlier part of the pulse. So the later, red edge of the pulse will spread into
 the adjacent medium more than it would have if its path had not been "al-
 ready prepared." So in figure 5, without diffusion, the ray EBAF would
 refract along BONA. But since the red edge diffuses into the adjacent me-
 dium, EBAF actually refracts along BOMA (63).
 The second factor involved in dispersion is the fact that the physical
 rays coming from the sun are not parallel. So both physical rays EBAF and
 Fig. 5. The Diffusion Hypothesis.
 Reproduced with kind permission of
 Science Heritage Limited. From
 Hooke 1665/1987, schem. VI, fig. 4.
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 CBAD (which might be coming from different edges of the sun) are re-
 fracted. Ray CBAD is refracted along the ray with edges BO and Q (for a
 fuller discussion of Hooke's theory, see Shapiro 1975).
 In his response to Pardies, Newton explicitly makes reference to phe-
 nomena at the unobservable, mechanical level when defining his notion of
 light ray:
 [B]y the rays of light I understand its least or indefinitely small parts which
 are independent of one another; such as are all those rays which luminous
 bodies emit either simultaneously or successively along straight lines. For
 both the collateral and the successive parts of light are independent; since
 some of the parts may be intercepted without the others and be separately
 reflected or refracted into any areas. (1672b, 164; trans, in Shapiro 1975, 200)
 Newton tells Pardies to understand light rays, as used in the original paper, as
 having "least or indefinitely small parts." And these parts "are independent of
 one another." Newton reads these assumptions back into his original paper.
 Why did Newton embrace these assumptions about the underlying struc-
 ture of light rays here? Consider the context. Pardies had advanced a diffu-
 sion theory to explain chromatic dispersion: the leading edge of a pulse is
 more "impeded by the resistance" of the medium than the later edge, and
 so this later part spreads out (see figure 5). This is a mechanical explana-
 tion of chromatic dispersion. On the one hand, it would have been very
 awkward to attempt to describe, much less attempt to refute, a mechanical
 explanation of dispersion without being able to talk about the phenomena
 at the mechanical level; it would be like trying to explain why a car will
 not run without talking about any of its parts. On the other hand, Newton
 did not want (or need) to embrace a full-blown emission or continuum theory
 of light. In fact, in the line previous to the above quotation, Newton said
 that "the doctrine explaining light and colours is based solely upon the
 properties of light, apart from explanatory hypotheses" (1672b, 169). Given
 these constraints, Newton could insist that he did not need to assume any
 full-blown "explanatory hypotheses" while claiming that light rays are the
 "least or indefinitely small parts" that "are independent of one another."3
 4. Inconsistency and partially indeterminate concepts
 A brief consideration of the responses to Hooke and Pardies uncovers a
 heretofore unrecognized anomaly in Newton's optical writings. In June 1672,
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 Newton posted, probably in one envelope, inconsistent accounts of what he
 assumed about the nature of light rays in his first publication. In answering
 Hooke, Newton claimed that his first publication completely eschewed the
 unobservable level of mechanical hypotheses. The response to Pardies, how-
 ever, explicitly does not relinquish reference to the unobservable, mechani-
 cal level. I will try to explain and defend this surprising allegation.
 In his response to Hooke, Newton defined a visible beam of light (call
 this an Η-ray); in his response to Pardies, he defined the least or indefi-
 nitely small independent parts of light (call this a P-ray). Visible beams
 cannot be indefinitely small, since they must be visible. So Η-rays are
 not identical to P-rays. One can describe Newton's experiments in terms
 of Η-rays or P-rays without inconsistency. Had Newton simply been ex-
 plaining the phenomena from different perspectives, there would be no
 worries about inconsistency. The problem arises because Newton is giv-
 ing different accounts of what he was saying in his original paper. Newton ys
 answers were interpretations of the exact same text! In his original paper,
 Newton argued that light fans out after passing through a prism because
 white light consists of rays of different degrees of "refrangibility." What
 exactly did Newton mean by rays! In his response to Hooke, he said light
 beams, and in his response to Pardies he said the least or indefinitely
 small parts of light. Given the assumption that light ray meant something
 determinate in his first publication, both answers cannot be correct. They
 are inconsistent.
 On closer examination, we can see that Newton's answer to Hooke is
 explicitly about light; he does not mention light rays. Newton's answer to
 Pardies is about light rays. Can this save Newton from inconsistency? No.
 Newton certainly knew that his response to Hooke describes his experi-
 ments in observational terms while his response to Pardies does not. Since
 he was responding to these objections at about the same time, it isn't sur-
 prising that he drew a terminological distinction between (observable) light
 and (unobservable) light rays. As I've already argued, there is no inconsis-
 tency in describing the phenomena in terms of light and in terms of light
 rays. But I am not arguing that Newton's explanations of the phenomena
 are inconsistent. Rather, my claim is that Newton's two accounts of what
 he was saying in his original paper are inconsistent. The question that brings
 on the trouble is the following: In his original paper, what exactly did New-
 ton mean by rays! In his response to Hooke, he said he meant light, but, in
 his response to Pardies, he said he meant light ray. These are not the same
 as Newton defines them. The terminological distinction between light and
 light ray cloaks this inconsistency, but does not explain it.
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 Semantic essentialists will refuse to believe that Newton could have "flip-
 flopped" so blatantly, by using incompatible concepts as they suited his
 purposes. But this reaction is unwarranted. It fails to recognize that scien-
 tific concepts are not pristine, unchanging inhabitants of Plato's Heaven.
 They do real work. And real work gets done in real contexts. Newton was
 facing very different challenges in the responses from Hooke and Pardies.
 To overcome these challenges, Newton required different resources. Against
 Hooke's very broad attack on Newton's explanation of prismatic disper-
 sion, Newton was best served to talk about his experiments in observa-
 tional terms. Against Pardies's claim that a specific competing mechanical
 hypothesis could explain the data perfectly well, Newton was forced to go
 beyond the observational level in talking about his experiments. There is
 no suggestion here that Newton was defending inconsistent theories of light
 in his responses to Hooke and Pardies. Newton defended a single theory of
 light, but he was able to express a number of different concepts and refer to
 a number of different features of light when he used the explanatory ex-
 pression light ray. He could talk about light rays as observable lines of
 light, as the least or indefinitely small independent parts of light, as travel-
 ing particles of light, and in a number of other ways as well.4
 There is another, better way to avoid saddling Newton with inconsis-
 tency. Suppose the concept of light ray Newton used in his first publication
 is in some (though not all) respects indeterminate. The use of a term Τ
 expresses an indeterminate concept just in case there is no fact of the mat-
 ter about whether any one of a certain class of descriptions correctly repre-
 sents the content of that concept. So suppose the concept of light ray that
 Newton employed in his first publication is indeterminate with respect to
 the nature of the substructure of light. There was no fact of the matter
 about whether light ray expressed a concept that assumed anything about
 the substructure of light. To put the point crudely, the concept of light ray
 is a partly empty vessel that can be "filled in" later in different ways in
 different contexts. If this is correct, then Newton is not guilty of inconsis-
 tency if he "fills in" the concept differently in different contexts. (Nor are
 other interpreters, for that matter.) Since Newton had different rhetorical
 and argumentative aims when responding to Hooke and Pardies, he chose
 to interpret his original expressions in somewhat different ways.5 If this
 reading is correct, then Newton may have made a mistake about the nature
 of his original concept. Like centuries' worth of interpreters, Newton may
 have failed to recognize the concept's indeterminate nature. Unless we sup-
 pose that speakers have privileged access to the meanings of their words,
 however, this mistake is neither surprising nor particularly significant.
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 Scientific expressions (like many others) are often supple and open-
 ended. The possibility of expressing a partially indeterminate concept is an
 important (and neglected) element of scientific practice. I suspect that in-
 determinate concepts are fairly common in descriptions of experiments that
 are meant to convince people with divergent theoretical commitments. In-
 determinate concepts allow scientists considerable flexibility to respond in
 the future to very different kinds of criticisms that might come from very
 different quarters. So my point here is not to vex Newton with charges of
 conceptual confusion, carelessness, or inconsistency. The possibility of
 expressing partially indeterminate concepts allows Newton to propose
 supple arguments that can be wielded in different ways under different cir-
 cumstances. Without this conceptual flexibility, Newton's argumentative
 and rhetorical practices would have been much different, and much poorer,
 than they actually were.
 5. General considerations in favor of
 semantic flexibility
 It is dangerous to draw general conclusions about the nature of science
 from a single case study. Thus, I want to propose two general consider-
 ations that drive us to conclude that semantic flexibility is a pervasive fea-
 ture of scientific practice.
 5. 1. The nature of scientific argument
 One might suppose that it is terribly uncharitable to suggest that Newton's
 use of the term light ray expressed different, and sometimes inconsistent,
 concepts. Isn't it more generous to suppose, along with semantic essential-
 ists, that at various stages in his career, Newton used a single concept of
 light ray? No. Ascribing to Newton a rigid concept of light ray is mis-
 guided charity. While it does grant him a stubborn sort of narrow consis-
 tency, it prevents us from interpreting him as proposing a series of layered
 arguments - arguments that employ steadily bolder concepts as more sub-
 stantive hypotheses are defended - or supple arguments that can be wielded
 in different ways under different circumstances.6 Further, and perhaps more
 troubling, semantic essentialism requires that we interpret Newton as hav-
 ing proposed at least some circular, question-begging arguments. If we adopt
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 the view that Newton always expressed a concept that assumed X (his theory
 of colors, the emission theory, or whatever), then any argument he could
 have given for thinking that light rays are X would have been question-
 begging. And the semantic essentialist could know this without even look-
 ing at the text! (If this be charity. . . .)
 This is a perfectly general point. Suppose that for some scientific term
 T, we assume that it expresses a concept that always makes the substantive
 assumption that Ts are X. Whenever a scientist argues that Ts are X, we are
 forced to interpret that argument to be question-begging. For example, sup-
 pose we claim that the gene concept always involves the assumption that
 genes are on chromosomes. That genes are on chromosomes is, of course,
 a substantive assumption for which scientists can argue and give evidence.
 Now suppose that a scientist sets forth such an argument and uses the ex-
 pression gene in the premises. Her argument will be circular - it will pre-
 suppose exactly what it sets out to prove. It is certainly possible for scien-
 tists to present circular arguments, and there are undoubtedly cases in which
 scientists have done so. However, adopting a rigid view of scientific con-
 cepts guarantees that scientists will be incapable of arguing noncircularly
 for their most basic assumptions. Surely, it is a mistake - on hermeneutic
 and historiographical grounds - to begin a study of an episode with a guar-
 antee that scientists will inevitably propose question-begging arguments.
 Yet this is precisely what semantic essentialists do.
 5.2. Consistency with psychological findings
 One of the most robust findings in psychology over the past few decades is
 that concepts are not represented in terms of singly necessary and jointly
 sufficient conditions (see Smith and Medin [1981] for a summary). While
 psychologists have proposed various models of how concepts are repre-
 sented, the negative point is not news to philosophers. It was one of
 Wittgenstein's most celebrated and widely accepted insights:
 Consider for example the proceedings that we call 'games.'. . . What is
 common to them all? - Don't say: "There must be something common, or
 they would not be called 'games'" - but look and see whether there is any-
 thing common to all. . . .
 And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of
 similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities,
 sometimes similarities of detail. (1953, 66)
 Suppose some concept is represented in terms of a set of non-necessary
 conditions. It follows that, for each of those non-necessary conditions, the
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 concept applies in some cases where it does not. One goal of this paper is
 to apply this insight, deftly articulated by Wittgenstein and repeatedly con-
 firmed by psychologists, to scientific practice. If Newton's concept of light
 ray is represented by conditions, some of which are non-necessary, then there
 will be cases in which Newton properly applies the term light ray even though
 one (or more) of its defining conditions do not obtain. As a result, we should
 expect Newton to apply his concept of light rays to entities with somewhat
 different features - observable lines of light, the least or indefinitely small
 independent parts of light, or traveling particles of light.
 One might argue that scientific concepts are special and different from
 our everyday, run-of-the-mill concepts; one might insist that they are rep-
 resented in terms of only necessary conditions. This is, of course, perfectly
 possible. But, given the available evidence, the burden of proof must be on
 the one who makes this suggestion. Until such a case is made, if we want a
 broad naturalistic framework that accounts for scientific change, it seems
 reasonable to adopt a philosophically and psychologically plausible story
 about the nature of scientific concepts. Such a story requires that we reject
 semantic essentialism.
 6. Implications of semantic flexibility
 Once we recognize the possibility that scientific terms are semantically
 flexible, both in terms of the concepts they express and in terms of what
 they refer to, we are forced to transform our views of a number of philo-
 sophical issues. I will focus briefly on two such issues, reductionism and
 theory-change.
 6. 7. Reductionism
 Semantic flexibility has important implications about the reductionism is-
 sue. Philosophers often wonder whether the insights, laws, or explanations
 of theory Tl can be or have been reduced to those of theory T2. For ex-
 ample, currently there is disagreement about whether classical genetics has
 been reduced to molecular genetics (see Kitcher 1984 and Waters 1990).
 Traditionally, there are two elements to theory reduction. First, there must
 be some sort of connection between the explanatory terms of the theories.
 Typically, the expressions of the reduced theory will be defined (exten-
 sionally) in terms of the expressions of the reducing theory. For example,
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 in the case of genetic reductionism, the central issue philosophers have
 debated is whether the gene of classical Mendelian genetics has been (or
 can be) reduced to molecular biology. The second element of theory-reduc-
 tion is that the laws of the reduced theory must be derivable from the laws
 of the reducing theory (together with "bridge principles," such as the above-
 mentioned definitions, that connect the vocabularies of the theories). In the
 case of genetic reductionism, this would involve showing how, starting from
 molecular genetics and bridge principles, it is possible to derive the laws of
 Mendelian genetics (e.g., the law of independent assortment).
 Now suppose that the terms of scientific theories are semantically flex-
 ible: On different occasions, they can express different concepts and they
 pick out different (or sometimes nonexistent) features of the world. What
 happens to reductionism? The issue fragments. There are no longer just
 two competing positions with respect to some allegedly reduced entity -
 reductionism or antireductionism. The issue becomes: Which senses of a
 term of one theory are reducible to which senses of terms of another theory?
 Many different positions on this question are available. And there is no a
 priori reason to believe that the most extreme positions are the most plau-
 sible candidates. So consider again genetic reductionism. It may be that
 gene as used by the most sophisticated spokespersons of classical genetics
 was always used univocally. And it may be that contemporary genetic terms
 are always used univocally. If so, it may be that one of the extreme posi-
 tions, reductionism or antireductionism, is true. What is peculiar about the
 debate on genetic reductionism is that the substantial middle ground has
 been completely overlooked. It may well be that some ways in which clas-
 sical geneticists used the term gene do reduce to molecular genetics while
 other senses of the term do not.
 6.2. Theory-change
 The context-sensitive approach has potentially far-reaching implications
 for general views about the nature of theory-change in science. The most
 common positions tend to rely implicitly on the assumption that a scien-
 tific theory has a single semantic structure, in which each term expresses
 only a single concept or refers to only a single object or type of object.7 For
 example, some nonrealists argue that different theories are conceptually
 (or semantically) incommensurable. But what does it mean to say that
 Newton's concept of light ray is incommensurable with anything when he
 (and his opponents) had so many concepts at their disposal? In contrast,
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 most realists argue that a term employed by two different but successful
 theories refers to the same thing (or same type of thing). But Newton's
 expression light ray could refer to many different things - a visible beam,
 an irreducibly smallest section of propagating light, a traveling particle of
 light, or an indefinitely small section of propagating light. If Newton by
 himself could refer to many different kinds of things with the term light
 ray, how could the expression, when used by Newton and his opponents,
 possibly refer to the same kind of thing on every occasion of use? The
 context-sensitive approach to scientific terms defended in this paper sug-
 gests that some of the most dominant models of scientific change are too
 crude to account for the richness and subtleties present in actual episodes
 of scientific debate and theory-change.
 Department of Philosophy
 Iowa State University
 Notes
 1 . Many currently dominant views about the nature of scientific theory-change suppose
 that scientific terms have a fairly static semantic structure. Some nonrealists, such as Kuhn
 (1962/70) and Feyerabend (1975/88), argue that the central explanatory terms of competing
 scientific theories are "incommensurable" - there is no theory-neutral language into which
 they can be translated without residue or loss. This view assumes that every time a scientific
 term is used, it expresses a concept that makes specific, substantive assumptions that render
 the term incommensurable with competing theories. In contrast, some scientific realists,
 such as Boyd (1984) and Putnam (1978), assume that a scientific term refers to a particular
 scientific kind every time it is properly used. This assumption allows the realist to argue that
 scientific language is often grounded in a corresponding reality. In both cases, scientific
 terms always have a fixed kernel of meaning.
 2. The semantic view I adopt in this paper is not the currently dominant view among
 analytic philosophers. I adopt it because it seems to be the one that is presupposed by those
 who actually interpret scientific texts and, in particular, by those semantic essentialists who
 interpret Newton's early optical writings. The dominant view among analytic philosophers
 about semantics is that the meaning of a scientific kind term is simply its reference, the class
 of entities to which it refers. The main points of this paper can be easily transformed so as to
 take seriously this view of scientific language. Semantic essentialism is the view that a sci-
 entific term, when properly used, always refers to a single class of entities. A close textual
 analysis of Newton's early optical writings show that his central explanatory expression,
 light ray, refers to quite different classes of entities on different occasions. (For a defense of
 a context-sensitive theory of reference that has this kind of consequence, see Kitcher 1993.)
 On at least some occasions, there was no fact of the matter about what exactly Newton's
 expression referred to. (For a defense of this possibility, see Field 1973.)
 3. The Pardies response presents a serious problem of interpretation. After claiming that
 he does not require any explanatory hypotheses, Newton presents a definition that seems to
 presuppose an emission theory of light. By asserting that the parts of light can "be separately
 reflected or refracted into any areas," Newton seems committed to the view that the parts of
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 light are projected through space. And this is possible only if we assume an emission theory is
 true and a continuum theory is false. How are we to resolve the apparent contradiction?
 It is very important to see that this problem of interpretation arises for everyone. It is not
 unique to the account of Newton's concepts offered in this paper. For example, Shapiro
 suggests that Newton intended to give Pardies "a phenomenological definition, which as-
 serts the observed property of light that every 'part' of a beam is reflected and refracted
 independently of any other 'part'" (1975, 201). While this resolution has a number of vir-
 tues, there is also an obvious problem. It leaves mysterious why Newton explicitly refers to
 the "least or indefinitely small parts" of light in his response to Pardies. That is not a "phe-
 nomenological definition" of light ray. Why didn't Newton simply define light rays phe-
 nomenologically, as the "something or other propagated every way in streight lines from
 luminous bodies"?
 One way to resolve the apparent contradiction in Newton's response to Pardies is to rec-
 ognize that Newton has many concepts of light ray available to him. Some of these presup-
 pose an emission theory of light and some do not. He uses more than one of them in his
 response to Pardies. How could this have happened? I would suggest that in the response to
 Pardies, Newton is struggling, and failing, to articulate a mechanical concept of light ray
 that is neutral between his emission theory and rival continuum theories of light. Evidence
 for this struggle appears in an unpublished reprint of his first paper. Here, Newton appears
 to give an account of light ray that adverts to the mechanical level but does not presuppose
 either emission or continuum theories of light. Newton states that whether light rays are
 particulate or wave-like, "light is equally a body or the action of a body in both cases. If you
 call its rays the bodies trajected in the former [emission theory] case, then in the latter [con-
 tinuum theory] case they are the bodies which propagate motion from one to another in right
 lines till the last strike the sense. The only difference is, that in one case a ray is but one
 body, in the other many" (Cohen 1958, 365).
 4. Newton was perfectly capable of expressing a concept of light ray that presupposed
 an emission theory of light. Consider, for example, Query 29 of the Opticks, in which New-
 ton offered a particulate explanation of the refraction and reflection of light:
 Pellucid Substances act upon the Rays of Light at a distance in refracting, reflect-
 ing, and inflecting them, and the Rays mutually agitate the Parts of those Substances
 at a distance for heating them; and this Action and Re-action at a distance very much
 resembles an attractive Force between Bodies. If Refraction be perform'd by Attrac-
 tion of the Rays, the Sines of Incidence must be to the Sines of Refraction in a given
 Proportion, as we shew'd in our Principles of Philosophy: And this Rule is true by
 Experience. The Rays of Light, in going out of Glass into a Vacuum, are bent toward
 the Glass, and if they fall too obliquely on the Vacuum they are bent backward into the
 Glass and totally reflected; and this Reflexion cannot be ascribed to the Resistance of
 an absolute Vacuum, but must be caused by the Power of the Glass attracting the Rays
 at their going out of it into the Vacuum and bringing them back. (1730, 370-71)
 In this passage, Newton brings the framework of the Principia to bear in explaining the
 refraction and reflection of light - a framework in which discrete bodies with mass are sub-
 ject to forces. Newton explains refraction from glass to a vacuum as follows: A particle of
 light that enters the glass-vacuum border at an oblique angle is attracted toward the glass;
 thus its path is bent away from the normal (and its velocity decreases). The particulate con-
 cept of light ray, along with many others, was also available to Newton early in his career.
 As Shapiro (1984, 129-33) has noted, Newton employed a particulate concept of light ray in
 a passage in the Optical Lectures.
 5. A partially indeterminate concept of light ray is not the same as a particular concept
 that is agnostic about the substructure of light, a concept we might explicate as "light rays
 whatever they are." If a token of light ray expresses an agnostic concept, it would be a
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 mistake later to interpret it in any other way. In particular, it would be a mistake to interpret
 it as a particle concept in one context and a wave concept in another. The agnostic concept
 has a perfectly determinate content that cannot be "filled in" later. The partially indetermi-
 nate concept, however, can later be properly interpreted as being a particle concept, and, in
 a different context, it can later be properly interpreted as not being a particle concept.
 6. Laymon (1978) focused on the ways in which Newton idealizes his descriptions of
 the crucial experiment in responding to Lucas. Newton's response to Lucas is likely to pro-
 vide further support for the context-sensitive view of Newton's concepts since it will prob-
 ably exhibit more ways in which Newton was willing to employ the expression light ray.
 7. Consider this objection: "We need to distinguish between the concept of light ray (or
 the reference of the term light ray) as used in Newton's optical theory and the variegated
 ways Newton might have used the expression in different situations. The former, proper use
 (unlike the latter, messy use) of the term expresses just one concept (or refers to one thing or
 one type ofthing)." Something like this may well be behind the uncritical belief in semantic
 essentialism. But the objection presupposes an untenable view of scientific theories. A sci-
 entific theory is not simply a set of sentences that have a rigid, single fixed meaning. A
 scientific theory is better understood as a set of complex (individual and social) practices
 and problem-solving procedures. Kuhn (1962/70) is the locus classicus of this view of theo-
 ries. See Kitcher (1993) for a sophisticated current treatment of this issue.
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